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PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
AND THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY
FERNANDO
L. CANALE
Andrews University
Berrien Springs,MI 49104
1. Introduction
It is difficult to imagine a less likely subject than the one suggested by
the title of this article. On one hand, philosophersmay fail to see the connection
between philosophicalreflection and a building. Not that philosophy,particularly
in its existentialist traditions, would shrink from reflecting on a building;
after all,buildings are part of the reality philosophy studies. Yet, philosophers
are not likely to relate the issue of philosophical foundations to the idea of
building or to any concrete building. On the other hand, classical and modern
theologians may wonder whether philosophical foundations are involved
in the study of the biblical sanctuary. Even theologiansstudyingthe biblical
text may find it difficult to see how philosophical foundations relate to the
sanctuary depicted in the OT and NT. In short, the very connection this
title suggestsmay appear problematic to most theologiansand philosophers.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the way in which philosophical
foundationsrelate to the theological interpretation of the biblical sanctuary.
Specifically, the connection between philosophicalfoundationsand biblical
sanctuary will be exploredin order to assess their role in the theologicalunderstan&
ing of the biblical sanctuary motif.
I have organized this essay in six sections. Following this (1)introduction,
(2) I will identdythe connectionbetween sanctuary and philosophicalfoundations
and describe its nature. Immediately thereafter, (3) a brief reference to the
nature of philosophical principles, their functions, and their classical and
postmodern interpretations will be presented. Then, I will explore the way
in which (4) classical and (5) modern foundations relate to the sanctuary.
In the final section (6) I will ponder the question of philosophicalfoundations
inherent in the sanctuary.

2. l%eNutwe of the Connection
The connection between sanctuary and philosophical principlescomes
into view in Exod 25:8.In this passage God requests the building of the Israelite
sanctuary. God tells Moses: 'Have them [Israelites] make a sanctuary for
me, that I may dwell among them." From the perspective of this pivotal
text the sanctuary [miqdas'l1appears as a building where God plans to dwell
[iukan]among human beings [btokam].Thus, the idea of sanctuary is not
reduced to a building but emerges as a God-building-human-beingsstructure.
This structure brings into view the inner connection that exists between
sanctuary and philosophicalfoundations. The connection takes place through
the ideas of God and human nature which are essentially involved in the
notion of sanctuary.
Sinceearlytimes, the study of philosophicalfoundationshas been known
under the general label of metaphysics. Accordingto Aristotle, metaphysics
studiesthe meaning of first principles of scientificknowledge.2To recognize
that among generally acceptedphilosophical foundationswe find the notions
of human nature,) nature (the world) ,' Gody5and Being6will suffice for the
'In his study of sanctuary terms in Exod 25-40, Ralph E. Hendrix reports that "miqdaj
(holy precinct), and b y i t (house) in reference to the divine dwelling, each occurs only once,
in Exod 25:8 and 34b:26 respectively" CThe Use of Mijkan and 'OhelMo id in Exod 25-40,"
Andrews University SeminaryStudies 30 [1992]: 5, n. 5). In these chapters two other words
are used consistentlyto refer to the sanctuary.Concludinghis word study, Hendrix suggests
"that mishn is used in constructional contexts, primarily associated with commands to
manufactureand assemblethe Dwelling Place of YHWH, but secondarily in its generic sense
as simply 'dwelling place.' The phrase bhel moid appears in literary contexts where the
cultic function of the habitation is the concern" (ibid., 13). In a more theological note he
adds that "in all contexts within Exod 2110 the biblical writer has masterfully controlled
the use of mishn and ?&el mo id in order to clarlfy the dual nature of YHWH's habitation.
That habitation was to be understood as a transient dwelling place, such as was consistent
with the dwelling places of nomadic peoples; therefore the choice of miikan. But yet, that
habitation also had the continuing function of fostering the cultic relationship, and this
aspect was best expressed by the choice of %el mo 8'
(ibid.). The variety in the use of words
to describe the sanctuary contributesto underline its God-building-beingsstructure. In this
article I am not addressing the complexity of the structure. The purpose of the essay only
requires its identification. However, we should notice that the "bui1ding"component does
not play a mediatorial role between God and human beings, but situates and articulatestheir
relationships in space and time.
'Aristotle Metaphysics 1. 1-2, 981b26-983a11. Aristotle describes the science we call
metaphysics as the study "that investigatesthe first principles and causes" (ibid., 1.2,982b9).
'Martin Heidegger underlines the role of human nature as principle of interpretation
of reality (ontology) (Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
[New York: Harper and Collins, 1962],62).
'Aristotle recognized that our understanding of the world is a principle of science. If
it were not by the existence of the science of God (theology), the science of the world would

limited purpose of this essay. Among philosophical foundations, Being is
the last and grounding one beyond or besides which there is no other. Due
to this unsurpassable universality, the notion of Being determinesthe general
nature of reality of which human nature, world, and God are regional aspects.
The meaning of Being, then, determines the general meaning of reality to
which any specific reality belongs.
Oncefirstprinciples are interpreted by philosophy,theybecome grounding
e
a
l
i
hermeneuticalprinciplesfor anYscienceof r
of Beingprovides the hermeneuticalprinciple necessary to interpret human
nature, world, and God. Philosophicalclarification on the general meaning
of these areas, in turn, becomes directly involved as hermeneuticalprinciples
for the sciencesof human nature (humanities), the world (the so-called factual
sciences), and God (theology).Christian theologiansshould be aware that
these principles are scientific in mode; that is to say, they come into play
whenever we approach the study of reality technically.The samehermeneutid
p~ciples,
however, are operative in everydaydiscourse, though in an implicit
prescientific mode.'
qualify as fist philosophical principle (Metupbyszcs, 6.1,1026a27-29).
5Philosophicallyspeaking, the ideas of God and human nature are subject matters
studied by regional ontologies. Thus,the ontological study of God, the world, and human
nature quahfy as philosophrcal foundations. Aristotle considered that "if there is an
immovable substance [God], the science of this must be prior [to the science of nature] and
must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first" (Mmapbysia, 6.1,
102629).
6Regionalontologies are not the first foundation of philosophy. They rest on the
overall view of reality interpreted by general ontology. General ontology has traditionally
addressed the common characteristics or traits of Being as they refer to beings (ibid., 4.1,
100322). Among them, for instance, we f i d the ideas of matter and form and potency and
act (ibid., 5.18, 1022a14-19; 4.6,1048a351048b9). Finally, regional and general ontologies
spring from the discussion of what Martin Heidegger called "foundational ontology."
Foundational ontology studies "the question of the meaning of Being in general" (Beingand
Time 31, 61). We should avoid confusing or fusing the God principle with the Being
principle. In his later writings Heidegger calls the concept of Beiig to play the role that is
usually played by the concept of God or the concept of the One. This usage not only
replaces the God principle but also involves panentheism. For this reason, we should avoid
mixing the God principle (the One) with the Being principle (the universal notion of Being)
as Heidegger seems to do. On the contrary, we should understand the formal defiition of
the Being principle as playing a role in the epistemological realm as in Aristotle's analogical
understanding of Being.
'Hans-Georg Gadamer describes the universality of hermeneutics by showing that
everyday experience necessarily involves bias or prejudice. He has clearly underlined that
our experience in its prescientific mode also involves principles; presuppositions; or, as he
points out in the following statement, prejudices: '7t can be shown that the concept of
prejudice did not originally have the meaning we have attached to it. Prejudices are not

The interpretation of the meaningof the bbias a Goctbuildinghuman-beings structure directly assumes a previous preunderstanding (philosophical principlesor presuppositions)of God, human beings, and the world.
Indirectly, however, it also requires a pre~nderstandin~
on the meaning of
Being. Consequently, any exegesisof the biblical data on the sanctuary and
their theological interpretation assumesthe foundational hermeneutical role
played by these principles.

3. Classical versus Postmodern Understanding of Being
Within the scientificmode of reflection, philosophicalpresuppositions
stem from the interpretationof the first principleor ultimatepresupposition,
namely, the implicit or explicit meaning of Being. A cursory description
of the two meanings in which the concept of Being has been understood
in Western thought will suffice to our purpose.8
Aristotle understood the scienceof Being as the science of the universal
which lays the ground and unity for all other sciences, includingtheology.9
Aristotledid not explicitlyreflect on Beingper se. He assumed the epoch-making
view of Parmenides, who advanced a timelessinterpretation.1°Plato, embracing
Parmenides' view that Being-reality as such-was of a timeless nonhistorical
nature, conceiveda bipolar interpretation of beings as a whole (metaphysics).
This bipolar interpretation of reality is known as the two-world theory,
necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. I . fact, the
historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute
the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our
openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience
something-whereby what we encounter says something to usn ("The Universality of the
Hermeneutical Problem," in Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. and trans. David E. Linge
[Berkeley, CA: University of Califorina Press, 1976],9). Bias and prejudice include all our
accumulatedpersonal experiences. The first principles of philosophy are biases or prejudices
we implicitly assumein everyday &course regardmg Being, God, world, and human nature.
Philosophicalprinciples are the explicit and sophisticated definition of the meaning of Being,
God, world, and human nature that determine the task of interpretation in all scientific
enterprise.
"For a detailed description of these two interpretations of Being, see my A Criticism
of TheologicalReason: Time and Tinelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs,
MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 66-130.

1°"Beinghas no corning-into-beingand no destruction, for it is whole of limb, without
motion, and without end. And it never Was, nor Will Be, because it Is now, a Whole all
together, One, continuous" (Parmenides,Fragments 6,7, in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilfa to
the Pre-SocraticPhilosophers:A Complete Translationof the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der
Vorsokratikw [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948],43).

which involves the intelligible and visible orders." The heavenly-intelligible
order is timeless and eternal, while the earthly-sensible order is temporal
and moving."
From Parmenides' intuitionof the meaning of Being (foundationalontology),
the interpretation of general ontology implicit in bipolar metaphysics, and
Aristotle's conception of the scienceof first principles, the universality and
absolute certainty that characterized the classical and modern minds came
to shape the destiny of Western civilization. This frame of mind decided
the scientificstructure of Christian theology soon after the N T was written
and has continued to be the foundation on which it is still constructed. As
we will see later, the Platonic-Aristotelianunderstanding of the first philosophical principleshas played a foundational herrneneutid role in the theological
interpretation of the biblical sanctuary.
The relentless criticism of tradition that characterizes the postmodern
mind has made possible an epochal change in the interpretation of the general
nature of ultimate reality. I am referringto the switch from the classical and
modern understandingof Being as timeless (as, for instance, in Plato, Aristotle,
Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Whitehead,
Barth, and Pannenberg) to its temporal interpretation in postmodernism.
This change was anticipated by Nietzsche and articulatedlater in technical
detail by Heidegger. In his opening statementsin Being and lime, Heidegger
gave explicit expression to this new understanding of reality: "Our aim in
the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being
and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time
as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."" The
postmodern search for truth, therefore, presupposes a radically different
concept of the ground on which reality as awhole is understood Thisprimordial
presupposition affects not only philosophy, but also the whole scientific
btheology. As a matter of fact, Heidegger's
enterprise, including of course, C
interpretation of the Being principle as temporality has already unleashed
"Plato summarizes his "two worldsntheory in his Republic 6,509d-511e.

"Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and
Collins, 1962),1.In the same general line of thought, Jean-Paul Sartre affirmed the "monism
of the phenomenon," which departs from the classical and modern dualism between
appearance and reality. According to Sartre, then, "the dualism of being and appearance is
no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy. The appearance refers to the total
series of appearances and not to a hidden reality which would drain to itself all the bang of
the existent. This appearance, for its part, is not an inconsistent manifestation of this beingn
(Beingand Nothingness: An Essay on PhenomenologicalOntology, trans. with introduction
by Hazel E. Barnes [New York: Philosophical Library, 19561,xlv).

a theological revisionism of the God principle.14
Early in the third millennium Christian theologians will face the fact
that duringthe twentieth century Western philosophy made the mom radical
turnabout sincethe days of Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle. Some sectors
of Christianity, buildingtheir theological perspectiveson the philosophical
foundations of classical and modern philosophy, will have a harder time
dealingwith this foundational intellectualchange than Christian theologians
attemptingto develop Christian theology based on the Protestant solasrriptua
principle. In other words, the temporal understanding of Being calls for a
deconstruction of Christian theology and its timeless conception of Being
and God. The correspondingconstructivephase and its repercussion in the
task of doing Christiantheology must wait for a more propitious time. Here
we need only to show some examples of the way in which the classical and
modem understan*
of philmphical principles relate to the biblical sanctuary
and what new ways the temporal-historicalunderstanding of Being opens
for the interpretation of the biblical sanctuary.
4. Sanctuury and Classical Foundations

In this section, my purpose is to show how classical interpretations
of the sanctuary result from either explicitly or implicitly acquiescingto
Platonic and/or Aristotelianphilosophicalfoundations.As describedin section
2, fm philosophical principlesinclude the Being, God, human nature, and
world principles. For the purpose of this essay I will concentrateon the God
principle, which in turn assumes the Being principle and the nature (world)
principle.15In the God-building-beingsstructure of the sanctuary, the former
relates to God and the latter to the building. In short, I will concentrate
on the notionsof God and/or nature (worl4 and their influenceon the theological
interpretation of the biblical sanctuary. For my purpose, I have surveyed
"Among these attempts we findJohn Macquarrie's identificationof the God and Being
principles (Pn'nciplesof Christian Theology [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19661, 115122). Thus God becomes assimilated to the generality proper to Being and therefore is
depersonalized. McQuarrie explains: "If we understand god as being, the relation is that of
being to the beings rather that [sic] one being to another" (ibid., 121). Schubert Ogden has
proposed a temporal understanding of God based on an analogy with Heidegger's notion
of human temporality (The Reality of God and Other Essays [New York: Harper and Row,
19661,144-163). For a summary of these and other ways of dealing with God's temporality
stemmingfrom Process Philosophy, see WilliamJ. Hill, Searchfor theAbsent God-Tradition
and Modernity in Religious Understanding (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 80-91.
l5 Throughout most of the history of Western philosophy and Christian theology, the
question of the meaning of Being has remained implicit in the interpretation of the God
principle. Explicit inquiry into the meaning of Being has taken place only recently in the
writings of Heidegger.

the way Philo, Aquinas, and Calvin deal with the biblical sanctuary motif
because they are influential representatives of the classical approach.

Philo of Alexandria (40/30B. C - A.D.40/50)
Philo is the most notable philosopherof AlexandrianJudaism. His syncretic
approach juxtaposedPlatonic, Stoic, Pythagorean, and Aristotelian elements.
His reinterpretation of Platonism provided a metaphysical frameworkthat,
with few variations, was adopted by all forms of Neoplatonism and became
influentialuntil Sch~lasticisrn.~~
Regardingthe God principle, Philo follows
classical Greek philosophy by adopting the timelessness interpretation of
God's being.17Consequently, God relatesto creation
The nature
(world)principle unfolds in harmony with the God principle. Philo interprets
the nature p r i i p l e as followingthe two orders or levels of Platonic ontology.
In creation (thenature principle),Philo seestwo orders or realms: the intelligible
and sensible universes.19Moreover, he places the intelligible universe in the
Logos, a subalternate duplication of God.20The intelligible world, then, is
not only timeless but also spaceless.
The nature principle causesPhilo to understand the sanctuary as a symbolic
representation of the intelligible and sensible orders.21Moreover, the God
16GuillermoFraile, Historia d e h Filosofi, 3 vols. Madrid: B.A.C., 1965,1966), 1:697.
""But God is the maker of time also, for He is the father of time's father, that is of the
universe, and has caused the movements of the one to be the source of the generation of the
other. Thus time stands to God in the relation of a grandson. For this universe, since we
perceive it by our senses, is the younger son of God. To the elder son, I mean the intelligible
universe, He assigned the place of firstborn, and purposed that it should remain in His own
keeping. So this younger son, the world of our sense, when set in motion, brought that
entity we call time to the brightness of its rising. And thus with God there is no future, since
He has made the boundaries of the ages subject to Himself. For God's life is not a time, but
eternity, which is the archetype and pattern of time; and in eternity there is no past nor
future, but only present existence" (Philo Quod Deus immutabilis sit, LCL, 31-32).
18"Soshall they [those prone to follow old fables] be schooled to understand that with
Him nothing is ancient, nothing at all past, but all is in its birth and existence timeless
(achron~s)"(Philo De Sacrt$ciis Abelis et Caini, LCL, 76).
19"When He [God] willed to create this visible world He first fully formed the
intelligible world, in order that He might have the use of a pattern wholly God-like and
incorporeal in producing the material world, as a later creation, the very image of an earlier,
to embrace in itself objects of perception of as many kinds as the other contained objects of
intelligence" (De Opificio Mundi, LCL, 4. 16). See also, Quod Deus immutabilis sit, 31-32.
''Philo explicitly underlines that "to speak of or conceive that world which consists of
ideas as being in some place is illegitimate" (De opificio mundi, 4. 17). Because of its nature
"the universe that consisted of ideas would have no other location than the Divine Reason,
which was the Author of the ordered frame" (ibid., 5.20).
"It seems that Philo understands the most holy place as including symbols of the
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principle leads him to an allegorical interpretation of Exod 25:8. What is
the meaning of God's intention to dwell in the tabernacle? Philo dismisses
the literal meaning in favor of a "deeper"one; that is, he interprets the text
as talking about God's dwelling in the sensibleworld." Specifically, Philo
says that God dwells in the world when the soulZ3hasan intellectual glimpse
interpretation
of his intellectualmanifestationd4Accordingto the
of the God principlePhilo adopts, God cannot dwell in the space-temporal
continuum of the OT tent. The allegorical interpretation is the process through
which the literal meaning of the text is deconstructed and reconstructed
in harmony with the dictates of the God principle. In Philo's allegorical
interpretation, the God-building-beingsanctuary structure is translated into
a God-beingstructure takingplace within the intellectual, nonhistoricalside
of reality. The philosophical principles Philo embraces call for a hermeneutical, deconstructivedismissal of the literal historical sense of sanctuary
texts in favor of an imaginative speculative constructionof an alleged "deeper"
intellectual nonhistorical allegorical meaning.

Aquinas followsthe same overall interpretation of Philo's God principle.
--

intelligible world, while the holy place refers symbolically to the sensible order.
Commenting on Exod 25:22, Philo opens his interpretationof the table in the holy place by
noticing that "having spoken symbolically of incorporeal things, when He was &coursing
divinely about the ark in the inner sanctuary, He now begins to speak of those things which
are in sense-perception, rightly and appropriately beginning with the table" (Questions et
Solutions in Exodus, LCL, 2.69). In more detail, Philo explains that "the highest, and in the
truest sense the holy, temple of God is, as we must believe, the whole universe, having for
its sanctuary the most sacred part of all existence, even heaven, for its votive ornaments the
stars, for its priests the angels who are servitors to His powers, unbodied souls, not
compounds of rational and irrational nature, as we are, but with the irrational eliminated,
all mind through and through, pure intelligences, in the likeness of the monad. There is also
the temple made by hands; for it was right that no check should be given to the forwardness
of those who pay their tribute to piety and desire by means of sacrifices either to give thanks
for the blessings that befall them or to ask for pardon and forgiveness for their sins" (De
Specialibus Legibus, LCL, 1. 66).
Ybid. 2.51; cf. De Pkzntatione 12.50.
nHere Philo brings the anthropological principle to play a significant role in the
interpretation of the sanctuary.
24uThenwill appear to thee that manifest One, Who causes incorporeal rays to shine
for thee and grants visions of the unambiguous and indescribable things of nature and the
abundant sources of other good things. For the beginning and end of happiness is to be able
to see God. But this cannot happen to him who has not made his soul, as I said before, a
sanctuary and altogether a shrine of God" (Questions et Solutions in Exodus 2.51).

PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS
AND THE BIBLICAL
SANCTUARY
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According to Aquinas, God is
and eternity is timeless because in
it there is no temporal s~ccession.~~
Regardingthe nature (world) principle,
Aquinas abandonsthe Neoplatonic tradition in favor of a modfi
Aristotelian
understanding.However, Plato's tweworld theory is still operative in Aquinas's
view, not as separate universes, but as always present components of the
unified hierarchical universal order of reality (nature/world) The nature
(world) principle finds its ontologicalground in the intellectual component
of reality that Aquinas conceives in analogy to the timelessness of the God
principle. In other words, Aquinas still conceivesthe real reality of the world
as belonging to the invisible nature of the intellect. Despite Aristotle's and
Aquinas' attempts at overcoming Platonic dualism, the visible historical
side of reality remains a lesser and dependent level of reality.
The great systematizer of Roman Catholictheology provides, as usual,
a clear synthesis of the general way in which theologians understood the
biblical sanctuary until the thirteenth century. Because God is incorporeal
while humans are corporeal (principleof nature), God cannot dwell in the
sanctuary, as Exod 25:8 clearly statesa Consequently, the God-building-beings
structure is deconstructed and reconstructed as a God-beings intellectual
relation of spiritual worship. God did not need the sanctuary for himself
or for his work of salvation.God willed the O T sanctuary for two reasons
that relate to humans. On the practical side, the sanctuary was needed for
worship and, on the theological side, for the prefiguration of Christ.29
Aquinas also has ametaphorical understanding of biblical language on

.''

25SummaTheologiae 1.10.2.
'Summa Theologiue 1.10.1 and 4.
"Aquinas developed his understanding of this principle in the brief booklet On Being
and Essence, trans. and notes, Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Medieval
Studies, 1949).
28"Fromthis [I Kgs 8: 27,29,30] it is evident that the house of the sanctuary was set up,
not in order to contain God, as abidmg therein locally, but that God's name might dwell
there, i.e., that God might be made known there by means of things done and said there; and
that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more devoutly,
so as to be heard more readily" (Summa Theologiue la-lae. 102.4. obj. 1).
'Summa Theologiae, la-2ae. 102.3. "The divine worship regards two things: namely,
God Who is worshiped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshiped,
is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle
or temple to be set up. But men, who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake
there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of God, for
two reasons. First, that through coming together with the thought that the place was set
aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly,
that certain things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be
signified by the arrangement of various details in such temple or tabernacle" (Summa
Theologiue la-2%. 102.4 obj. 1).

heavenly sanctuary texts?' The reason for the metaphorical understanding
of the heavenly sanctuary is the consistent application of the God and nature
principles. Since Christ (simultaneously being God and glorif~ed
human nature)
asmndedaboveall corporeal heavens" where there is no place, biblical statements
placing God in a heavenly sanctuary must be read metaPhoricallyP Conversely,
texts placing God above the heavens (where there is neither time nor place)
can be interpreted literally.)3Heavenly sanctuary (priesthood) language is
a metaphor pointing to divine being and action. For instance, Christ's sitting
at the nght hand of the Father "in the heavenly realmsn(Eph k20) metaphorically
signifies (1) the glory of the Godhead, (2) the beatitude of the Father, and
'The study of the nature and function of metaphor in human discourse and theology
is very complex. For the limited purposes of this article I will use the notion of metaphor
as those utterances functioning "in two referential fields at once. This duality explains how
two levels of meaning are linked together in the symbol. The first meaning relates to a
known field of reference, that is to the sphere of entities to which the predicates considered
in their established meaning can be attached. The second meaning, the one that is to be made
apparent, relates to a referentialfield for which there is no h e c t characterization, for which
we consequently are unable to make identdying descriptions by means of appropriate
predicates" (Paul Ricoeur, fie Ruk ofMefaphor:Multi-disciplinury Studies ofthe Creation of
Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello
[Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977J 299). "Most simply, Sallie McFague explains:
a metaphor is seeing one thing as something else, pretending 'this' is 'that' as a way of saying
something about it. Thinking metaphoricallymeans spotting a thread of similarity between
two dissimilar objects, events, or whatever, one of which is better known than the other, and
using the better-known one as a way of speaking about the lesser known" (Metaphorical
Theology: Models of God in Religious Language [Philadelphia: Fortress, 19821, 15). In this
broad sense,the notion of metaphor overlapsthe ideas of symbol and figurative language (cf.
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Sutplus of Meaning p o r t Worth: Texas
Christian University Press, 19761, 4569; McFague, 10-14). From these descriptions, it
follows that when we read a text metaphorically, we assume the meaning of its subjectmatter or referent. As I will argue in the following pages, Christian interpretations of O T
and NT sanctuaries usually flow from the philosophicalinterpretation of the God principle
used to decide the metaphoricalnature of the texts, thereby openingthe meaning of the texts
to the free play of the creative imagination of the reader. Of course, metaphors do not
require timeless transcendence as referent. Metaphors do play a cognitive illuminative role
in common discourse referring to the Lebenswelt (cf. Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons
in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading [Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 19921,351-358).
"Aquinas recognizesthe existence of seven corporeal heavens. However, when applied
to God, he understands heaven metaphorically (Summa Theologiae 1.68.4).
"As, for instance, "The Lord is in his holy temple; the Lord is on his heavenly throne"
(Ps 11A); 6.Summd Theologiae 3.57.4.
33Forinstance, "He who descended is the very one who ascended higher than all the
heavens in order to fill the whole universe" (Eph 4:10 and Ps 8:2). Cf. Summa Theologiae
3.57.4, and obj. 1-2.

(3) j~diciarypower.~
Here the biblical notion of sanctuary and its God-buildingbeings structure is deconstructed to a God-only referent.

John C;zlvin(1509-1564)
Protestantism made Scriptureplay a greater role in its theological formulation~
than
~ ~ Roman Catholicismhad duringthe scholasticperiod. Even
though Calvin's theological synthesis closely followsbiblical language, the
God and nature principles mill rest on the classical understanding of God's
timeless eterni$6 and spacial ubiquitousness." The latter involves the notions
that 'no place can be assigned to God" and that 'his presence, not confined
to any region, is diffused over all ~pace."'~
Heaven, therefore, is not a place
where God lives, acts, and enters into relationship with his creatures, but
is a metaphor for God's ineffable glory.39
Following in Philo's and Aquinas' paths, Calvin understood the OT
sanctuary as a twofold metaphor facilitating real worship4' and pointing
%mmu

Theologize 3.58.2..

35JaroslavPelikan, The Christian Tradition:A History of the Development of Doctrine
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971-1989), 4:118-119.
361nstitutesof the Christian Religion 1.13.7-8; 14.3.

38Comrnentingon the Lord's Prayer statement, "Our Father which art in heaven,"
Calvin asserts, on the basis of 1 Kgs 8:27 and Isa 66:1, "that his [God's] presence, not
confined to any region, is diffused over all space." From this basis Calvin immediately
asserts that "as our gross minds are unable to conceive of his ineffable glory, it is designated
to us by heaven,nothing which our eyes can behold being so full of splendor and majesty.
While, then, we are accustomed to regard every object as confined to the place where our
senses discern it, no place can be assigned to God; and hence, if we would seek him, we must
rise,higherthan all corporeal or mental discernment. Again, this form of expression reminds
us that he is far beyond the reach of change or corruption, that he holds the whole universe
in his grasp, and rules it by his power." O n this ground, Calvin interprets the Lord's prayer
statement "Our Father which art in heaven" metaphorically because the God principle, not
allowing God the ontologicalcapacity of being in time or a place, demands a metaphorical,
figurative sense. Thus, the text cannot mean what it says regarding place. Calvin assures us
that the meaning of the text is "the same as if it had been said, that he is of infinite majesty,
incomprehensibleessence, boundless power, and eternal duration. When we thus speak of
God, our thoughts must be raised to hear the highest pitch, we must not measure him by
our little standards, or suppose his will to be like ours" (Institutes 3.20.40).

"Commenting on God's command, "let them make me a sanctuary,"Calvin warns that
"we must beware of imagining anything inconsistent with the nature of God [the God
principle], for He who sits above the heavens, and whose footstool is the earth, could not
be enclosed in the tabernacle; but, because in His indulgence for the infirmities of an
ignorant people, He desired to testlfy the presence of His grace and help by a visible symbol,

to Christ." The heavenly sanctuary, likewise, becomes a metaphor for the
spiritualefficacy that emanatesfrom Christ's spiritual body (thereal sanctuary)
to
Calvin's hermeneutical principles (God and nature principles) demand
that sanctuary texts be understood as metaphors for true worship and the
eternal efficacy of Christ's salvation for us. By the application of philosophical
principles originatingin classical Greek philosophy, the God-building-beings
sanctuary structure of the biblical texts becomes reconstructed as the God
[Christ]-beings pattern of theological discourse.
The cases included in t h s section have been few and cursorily addressed.
However, they may help us to see how the philosophical foundations of
theology become hermeneutical principles guidingthe interpretation of the
biblical sanctuary motif. Philo, Aquinas, and Calvin, belonging to
widely diverse theological traditions, yet work within the same PlatonicAristotelian interpretation of the God and nature principles. These principles
determined their reading of the O T and N T texts
have hermene~ticall~
on the sanctuary.The timeless, spaceless interpretation of the God principle,
unable to fit the temporal spatial meaning of the texts, calls for allegorical,
--

-

the earthly sanctuary is called His dwelhg amongst men, inasmuch as there He was not
worshiped in vain. And we must bear in memory what we have lately seen, that it was not
the infinite essence of God, but His name, or the record of His name, that dwelt there"
(Commentaries on the Four Books of Moses Arranged in the Form of a Harmony, trans. C.
William Bingham [Grand Rapids: Eerdrnans, 1950],4: 150).
""When we would seek the body or substance of the ancient shadows, and the truth
of the figures, we may learn them, not only from the Apostle, but also from the Prophets,
who everywhere draw the attention of believers to the kingdom of Christ; yet their clearer
explanation must be sought in the Gospel, where Christ, the Sun of Righteousness, shining
forth, shows that their fulfilment exists in Himself alone. But, although by His coming He
abolished these typical ceremonies as regards their use, yet at the same time He established
the reverence justly due to them; since they have no claim to be held in esteem on any other
ground, except that their completion is found in Him; for, if they are separated from Him,
it is plain that they are mere farces" (ibid., 154).
"Commenting on Heb 9:11, Calvin assures us that he has no doubt that in this passage
the author "means the body of Christ; for as there was formerly an access for the Levitical
high priest to the holy of holies through the sanctuary, so Christ through his own body
entered into the glory of heaven" (Commentarieson the Epistle to the Hebrews, trans. John
Owen [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19481, 202). Moreover, Calvin argues that "the word
sanctuary is fitly and suitably applied to the body of Christ, for it is the temple in which the
whole majesty of God dwells" (ibid.). In the following paragraph Calvin, rigorously
applying the God principle to the interpretation of the text, explicitly explains that it does
not refer to Christ's "material body, or of what belongs to the body as such, but of the
spiritual efficacy which emanates from it to us. For as far as Christ's flesh is quickening, and
is a heavenly food to nourish souls, as far as his blood is a spiritual drink and has a cleansing
power, we are not to imagine anything earthly or material as being in them" (ibid., 203).

figurative, or metaphorical interpretations.
Thus, the philosophicalinterpretation of God, working as hermeneutical
principle, requires the deconstruction of the literal meaning of the text.
Specifically, the God and nature principlescannot accommodatethe reality
of the God-building-beingsstructure characteristic of sanctuary passages.
Classical theology achieves this theological deconstruction of the biblical
text by way of a metaphorical,ftgurative, or allegorical reconstructionbeyond
the meaningof the text itself. One end result of this process is the replacement
of the God-building-beingsstructure of biblical texts with either a God or
God-beings pattern akin to the spacelessness and timelessness of the God
principle.
5. Sanctuary and Modern Foundations

Can we modify the philosophical foundations of Christian theology?
Of course, we can. Not infrequently, new theological trends can be traced
back to alterations in the understanding of philosophical foundations. In
avery real sense modern theology results from Kant's adjustment of reason's
role to the limits of space and time.'3 It can be argued that Kant's epistemological
position is only a modification by limitation of the classical interpretation
of the principle of reason" which leaves the classical timeless interpretation
of God ~nchallen~ed.'~
Almost a century before Kant, we can find some traits of what will
become the modern approach to theology in Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza's panen43Kantconcludes: "It is therefore not merely possible or probable, but indubitably
certain, that Space and Time, as the necessary conditions of all our external and internal
experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions, in relation to which all
objects are therefore mere phenomena, and not things in themselves, presented to us in this
particular manner. And for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be
said Li priori, while of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these
phenomena, it is impossible to say anything" (Critique of Pure Reason, tr. J.M.D.
Meiklejohn [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 19901, 39). Thus, Kant rejected the AristotelicThomistic understanding of reason as "active intellect," able to reach timeless objects, and
replaced it with his "transcendental reason" capableof reaching only spatio-temporalobjects.
&The principle of reason is another philosophical foundation of theology. In the
classical tradition it was subsumed, as theory of knowledge, under the human nature
principle. Modern philosophy, under Kantian leadership, addressed it as "criticism." In
more recent times theologians have come to address the same philosophical issue under
varied headings: for instance, epistemology and hermeneutics.
45Aftercareful analysis Kant feels that we may "determine our notion of the Supreme
Being by means of the mere conception of the highest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient,
eternal, and so on-in one word, to determine it in its unconditioned completeness by the
aid of every possible predicate. The conception of such a being is the conception of God in
its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a
transcendentaltheology" (ibid., 325).

theistic interpretation of the God principle* leads him to review the classical
concept of revelation and inspiration of Scripture. Since all human beings
know God directly through reason," and the necessary order of nature4*
(God principle and Nature principle are identical), Spinozabelieves that the
activity of the prophet takes place in his imaginati~n.'~
Thus, the human
locus of revelation-inspirationswitches from reason to imagination. This
momentous turn will become instrumental in the theological adoption of
the historical-criticalmethod of Bible interpretation,where miracle becomes
a general term designating"any work whose cause is generally unknown,"50
and historical narratives do not reveal God but "are very profitable in the
matter of social relation^."^^ Not surprisingly,Spinoza interprets the ceremonial observances of the OT as referring to the historical-social reality
of the commonwealth of Israel." Moreover, the very content of biblical language
on cultic ceremonies originates "only from contemporary custom.n53
With time, the modern trend foreshadowed by Spinozacame to classify
biblical thought under the category of myth. Early in the nineteenth century
Ernst Cassirer described the nature of "myth" from a Kantian perspective
as a consciousnessthat "knows nothing of certain distinctions which seem
absolutelynecessary to empirical-scientificthinking."%Accordingto Cassirer,
mythical thinking confuses "representation" with "realnperception, wish

47TractatusTheologico-Politicus,trans., by Samuel Shirley with intro. by Brad Gregory
(Leiden: Brill, 1989), 70.

49"God'srevelations were received only with the aid of the imaginative faculty, to wit,
with the aid of words or images, hence it was not a more perfect mind that was needed for
the gift of prophecy, but a more lively imaginative facultyn(ibid., 65).

52Dueto his panentheism and revisionism of revelation and inspiration, Spinoza
believed that "ceremonial observances served to strengthen and preserve the Jewish state"
(ibid., 112).
5'"Thus the Patriarchs sacrificed to God not through some command imposed on them
by God, nor because they were instructed by the universal principles of the Divine Law, but
only from contemporary custom. And if they did so by anyone's command, that command
was simply the existing law of the commonwealth in which they were dwelling, by which
they, too, were bound" (ibid., 116).
%ThePhilosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 2, Mythical Thought, trans. Ralph Manheim
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 36.

with fulfillment, and imageswith things." Moreover, mythical thought "does
not begin when the intuition of the universe and its parts and forces are merely
formed into definite images, into the figures of demons and gods; it begins

only when a genesis, a becoming,a l$i in time, is attributed to the~efi~ures."'
Thus, myth, thinking of God in time and space, becomes another specific
way to describe metaphorical thought.
We have seen how the classical interpretation of the God principle rules
out the notion that God may directly relate with space and time. Modern
theology has not introduced significant changes in this regard. However,
the decisivetilt toward historicity that, since the Enlighten-ment, has been
taking place in some philosophicalquarters (notably in historicism and phenomenology) has moved philosophers and theologiansto question the classical
notion of God's absolute timelessness. Process Philosophy is a notable exponent of this trend.
Process Philosophy has not only criticized the notion of timelessness
but has proposed a new view of God, according to which time and space
become part of God's dipolar nature.57However, this introduction takes
place at the expense of replacing the personal notion of God's nature with
a panentheistic one. How does the reinterpretation of the God principle
proposed by Process Philosophyplay when applied to the biblical sanctuary?
Specifically, does the introduction of time in God's nature as proposed by
Process Philosophy, recognize the God-building-beingsstructure of sanctuary texts? Not at all. Although Process Philosophy's revision of the God
principle calls for the reinterpretation of major Christiandoctrines," its application to the sanctuary requires the same metaphorical understandmg required
by the classical view. One reason for this similarityis that in a panentheistic
view of God, God becomes the place where beings exist.59Therefore, God

561bid.,104 (emphasis mine). Cassirer continues, "Only where man ceases to content
himself with a static contemplation of the divine, where the divine explicates its existence
and nature in time, where the human consciousnesstakes the step forward from the figure
of the gods to the history, the narrative, of the gods-only then have we to do with 'myths'
in the restricted, specific meaning of the word" (ibid).
"Alfred N. Whitehead affirms that "the consequent nature of God is conscious; and
it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature" (Process and Reality: A n
Essay in Cosmology [New York: Macmillan, 19291,524).
58Notably,the doctrine of God (cf. John J. O'Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The
Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the Theology of Hope [Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 19831, 53-107).
5Whitehead writes, "The actuality of God must also be understood as a multiplicity
of actual components in process of creation. This is God in his function of kingdom of
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cannot relate to beings from their outside but from their inside. God is the
place of beings. Consequently, the God-building-beingsstructure essential
to the biblical sanctuary must be taken to be God-beings. Specifically, the
sanctuary as a building and the divine activities associated with it must be
read metaphorically.60
From the perspective of the new historical-exegetical approach to Biblical
Studiesoriginating in modern times, biblical literatureon the sanctuary sheds
some light on our understanding of O T and N T cultus and rituals because
the sanctuary was obviously central to Israel's cultus. However, from the
theological perspective of Christian dogmatics, the sanctuary continues to
play no role. Theologically, the sanctuarybecomes amyth because the biblical
writings on the sanctuary attribute to God alife in time and space. Therefore,
the sanctuaryprobably refers to human religious experience in the context
of a panentheistic understanding of reality.
Nevertheless, one should not forget that during the modern period the
classical approach to the interpretation of the sanctuarycontinues exercising
its influence not only on dogmatic interpretationsbut, at times, also on exegetical
ones.61Someexegetes,however, have begun to convey the meaningof sanctuary
heaven. Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature" (ibid.,
531).

bOIn the next to the last paragraph of his Process and Reality Whitehead uses the word
"heaven" as a metaphor for God's primordial nature: "What is done in the world is
transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world.
By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and
floods back again into the world" (ibid., 532).
"Within the Protestant tradition, for instance, F. F. Bruce tells us that the heavenly
sanctuary, the "'real sanctuary' belongs to the same order of being as the saint's everlasting
rest of [Hebrews] chs. 3 and 4" (The Epistle to the Hebrews [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19641,
163). Since, according to Bruce, the order of being of the saint's everlasting rest is the
immortality of the soul (ibid., 78-79), Platonic ontology still shows up playing its
hermeneuticalrole. In my opinion, the same classical interpretation of the God principle is
operative in his rejection of the historical understanding of the Atonement and the
typologicalinterpretation of the sanctuary(ibid, 200-201;fn. 82). From the Roman Catholic
tradition, Aelred Cody goes a step further when he sees the Platonic interpretation of the
God and nature principles working not from the reader's hermeneutic assumptions but from
the author's: "The theology of the economy of salvation in Christ is presented by the
Epistle's author in the form of a symbolic parable using the categories of Alexandrian
dualism" (Heavenly Sanctuary and Liturgy in the Epistle to the Hebrews: i%e Achievement of
Salvation in the Epistle's Perspectives [St. Meinrad, IN: Grail, 19601, 155). Norbert Huge&
warns us against "me interpritation simpliste, qui ferait se figurer un Christ matiriellement
assis B droite de Dieu le Pire, sur un tr6ne &or, comme on l'a w, h6las, par des
reprbentations pieuses, coiff6 d'une couronne et revetu d'un manteau d'apparat" (Le
Samrdoce du Fils: Commentaire & 1'6ph-e aux He'breux [Paris: Fischbacher, 19831,237-238).
To help us avoid a naive reading of "Christ sitting at the right hand of God" (Heb 1:3; 8:l;
10:12; and 12:2), Hugedt! quotes directly, in an authoritative manner, from the metaphorical
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texts without calling on philosophical categoriesto interpret their referents."
Tacitly, these exegetes replace the notion of a timeless-spaceless God with
the biblical notion that the reality of God is free to relate personally and
directly with time, history, and space." In so doing they implicitly point
interpretations of Augustine and Aquinas (ibid., 238).
62WalterC. Kaiser, Jr., understands the O T tabernacle as primarily embodying the
theology of worship. The sanctuary "assumes that God is the Great King who reigns and is
therefore worthy of our praise and adoration. Even more specifically, the meaning of the
tabernacle is that God has come 'to dwell,' 'to tabernacle' in the midst of Israel, as he would
one day come in the Incarnation (John 1:14) and will come in the Second Advent (Rev 21:3).
The Lord who dwelt in his visible glory in his sanctuary among his people (Exod 25:8) will
one day come and dwell in all his glory among his saints forevern ( "Exodus," Expositor's
Bible Commentary [Grand Rapids: Zondervan: 1973],2:452). William L. Lane recognizes
that the word skengis used in Heb 8-9:10 "consistently in a local sense to designate the
heavenly sanctuary (8:2) or the desert sanctuary (8:5), or to denote the front or rear
compartments of the tabernacle (9:2, 3, 6, 8). The thrust of the argument is that the
tabernacle with its division into two chambers was constructed according to the pattern or
model shown to Moses on Mount Sinai (see on 8:5). The writer appears to have held a
realistic understanding of Exod 25:40 and related texts, according to which a spatially
conceivedsanctuaryconsisting of two compartments existed in heaven and had provided the
pattern for the desert sanctuary" (Hebrews 9-13, WBC, 47b [Dallas: Word, 19911,237-238).
"Exegetical interpretations, however, do not, per se, inform theological discourse.
Frequently, theologians summarily dismiss them as amusing possibilities that they, of
course, cannot take seriously in the realm of dogmatic discourse. Biblical exegesis, after all,
is supposed to fit the system dictated by the philosophical interpretation of theological
principles. However, some less recognized and studied traditions seem to have entertained
a more literal reading of the biblical sanctuary motif. For instance, according to Bryan W.
Ball, seventeenth-centuryPuritan theology follows Aquinas' and Calvin's views regarding
the interpretation of the O T sanctuary as a metaphor of Christ's work (The English
Connection: ?'hePuritan Roots of Seventh-day Adventist Belief [Cambridge: James Clarke,
19811, 107-109). At the same time, however, his study seems to imply that, regarding the
understandingof the heavenly sanctuary and Christ's ministry, an incipient departure from
tradition begins to take place in some Puritan writers. O n the one hand, Puritan theology
seems to follow the classical approach. Ball summarizes his findings regarding the Puritan
interpretation of the biblical heavenly sanctuary texts by saying that "it is only necessary to
open the relevant literature at the appropriate pages to discover that Puritan writers saw no
valid reason to depart from a literal interpretation of those passages of Scripture which
referred to the existence of a sanctuary in heavenn (?'he English Connection, 110). Although
some Puritan writers recognize that the "form and matter" of the heavenly sanctuary are "of
a different kind than the "form and matter" of the earthly sanctuary, they still understand
heavenly sanctuary texts as disclosing the reality of a building in heaven where Christ
performs His ministry. Ball describes the Puritan view of the reahy of the heavenly
sanctuary by saying that for Puritan writers "the heavenly sanctuary, real as it undoubtedly
is, according to the clear testimony of Scripture, is of a far more excellent nature than its
copy constructed on earth by men" (ibid.). The "matter and formnof the heavenly sanctuary
"is of another kind, far more fair, pure, sublime, and stable than this which we see. And to
this building pertains that heavenly tabernacle of Christ our high priest, which is the temple
and residence of the Most High Godn (Thomas Lushington], The Expiation of a Sinner: In

to the need of deconstructing the philosophical interpretation of God and
its role as hermeneutical principle of theological discourse.
Changes in the interpretation of the God principle necessarily involve
substantialmodificationsin the understandingof the Being principle. What
is the significanceof this incipient and seemingly inconsequential departure
from theological tradition?

6. Sanctuary and Biblical Foundations
foundationshave consistently required
Classical and modem
a metaphorical interpretation of the God-building-beingsstructure present
in the biblical texts that unveil the reality and meaning of the sanctuary.
Working as hermeneutical principles, they have set the ontological stage
to which the sanctuary refers. Apparently,the meaning of the God-buildingbeings sanctuary structure depends on the nature of its central component,
God The understandingof the God principle, then, determinesthe ontological
referent of sanctuary language.
In sections 4 and 5 we have seen that when theologians embrace the
timeless interpretation of the God principle, an unbridgeableincompatibility
between the building (worldprinciple) and the God componentsof the sanctuary
structure takes place. The plain literal sense of sanctuary texts cannot be
incorporated into theological discourse because God is assumed to exist in
timelessnesswhile the notion of bdding standsin time and space. Consequently,
a metaphorical-figurative reading becomes imperative. The metaphorical
sense applies, primarily, not to God or humans but to the sanctuary as building.
By extension, however, the metaphoricalsense reaches the whole God-bddingbeings structure of sanctuary texts both in OT andNT. Metaphorical approaches
a Commentary upon the Epistk to the Hebrews (1646), 167; this work appears to be largely
a translation from a Latin commentary on Hebrews by Johannes Crellius (1590-1633),
quoted in Ball, The English Connection, 110). On the other hand, if Ball's assessment of
Puritan theology is correct, some Puritan writers' views of Christ's postresurrection
priestly ministry are closely related to their recognition of the God-building-beingsstructure
of the sanctuary as a literal reality in heaven. For some Puritan writers Christ's heavenly
ministry is no longer a metaphor pointing to his eternal salvific grace (Aquinas), or the
spiritual efficacy of Christ's spiritual body (Calvin). Instead, they conceive Christ's
postresurreaion heavenly ministry as a necessary continuation of his salvific activities
initiated at the cross. Cross and heavenly ministries are consecutive, complementary salvific
acts of Christ without which our salvation cannot be accomplished. "The death and blood
of Christ is [sic] not enough to the cleansing of our souls, unless the blood be sprinkled, the
death of Christ applied to us. There must be a work of application as well as of redemption.
All the precious blood that Christ hath shed will not save a sinner, unless this blood be
effectually applied and sprinkled on the soul. Application is a great and necessary part of our
recovery and salvation, as well as the blood of Christ itself" (Samuel Mather, Figures or Types,
318; quoted in Ball, 104). For further discussion and sources see Ball, 103-107.

PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS
AND THE BmLICAL SANCTUARY

20 1

to the sanctuary texts require a transpositionMof the building notion from
its immediatespatietemporal settingto the realm of divine timeless eternity.
Unfortunately, this transposition alters the God-building-beingsstructure
to a buildingless God-beings relation. This way of interpreting sanctuary
texts has the advantage of producing a coherent understanding, yet theological consistency is attained at the expense of dismissing substantial facets
of the texts and the realities they illumine.
Classical and modern theologies are right in insistingthat our reading
of the sanctuary texts be consistent and that consistency assumes that the
subject matter about which the texts speak (the God-building-beingsstructure)
stands on a unified understanding of reality. Theological interpretations of
biblical texts, then, always assume a philosophicalunderstanding of reality
that they leave unthought and unsaid. Precisely because Scripture does not
explicit$ addressthe interpretation of Being, God, human nature, and nature
principles,theologianshave consistently drawn their understanding of them
from philosophy.
Modernism and postmodernismhave increasingly questionedthe timeless
view of classical theology. However, they have come short of abandoning
the timelessness of God. They see classical timelessness as lacking proper
balance as it relates to temporal historical realities. Consequently, modern
and postmodernviews are inclined to correct this imbalance by introducing
time into the notion of God.65Methodologically, new interpretations are
usually constructed by the freeplay of philosophicalspeculationand imagination.
Is it possible to reach a theological understandingof the biblical sanctuary
that, while mindful of conceptual consistency,may preserve the God-buddingbeings structure essential to the subject matter uncovered by the texts?I think
it is. I would like to suggest an alternate way to reach a consistent theological
interpretation of the sanctuary, probably in harmony with some Puritan
and someBiblical Theology readings of the sanctuary.A consistenttheological
interpretation of the sanctuarythat doesnot require the metaphorical translation
of its God-building-beingsstructure starts with the reinterpretation of the
God principle. Such an alternateviewrequirestwo basic steps: the deconstruction
of the classical and modern interpretationsof the God principle and the selection
of a startingpoint from which to think anew and formulate a reconstruction
of the God principle in harmony with the biblical text.

The starting point
Is there another way to reinterpret the meaning of the God principle
65Hegeltakes the lead in this regard. Process philosophy is another example of this
trend (see section 5).

besides the free play of philosophical speculation and imagination?Regarding
the understandingof God, are we bound by the imagination (reason)-silence
alternative?Contrary to the opinion of most philosophers and theologians,
Heidegger believed that on the question of God, philosophy must keep silent
while nursing an expectant mood waiting for the revelation of God within
the horizon of Being.66In short, it seems that Heidegger thought that God
should reveal himself just as Being does in the experience of Darein (concrete
human existence).Theologiansare supposedto wait for God to present himself
against the background provided by the general principle of Being and then
be
to attune themselves to it. We may speculate why Heidegger
did not develop a philosophical reflection on God." It seems reasonable to
suspect that Heidegger did not develop an explicit philosophy on the being
of God because he was unable to find a starting point where the being of
God would present itself within the realm of Dasein.
I have argued elsewherethat the startingpoint for the Christian interpretation
of the God principle is Scripture? Throughout the history of Christian thinking,
Exod 3:14-15 has been recognized as the locus classicus where the being of
God is brought into language. After changesin interpretation, biblical exegesis
has come to recognize that this text speaks of the presence of God in history

66JamesL. Perotti's study on Heidegger's notion of the divine reports that Heidegger
recognizes the existence of past disclosures of God but, since in the present time God does
not reveal himself, philosophers must keep silence and an attitude of expectation for the
future revelation of God. "In the essay, Das Ding, Heidegger cites three past manifestations
of the divine: in the gods of ancient Greece, in the Jewish prophets, and in the sayings of
Jesus. But these manifestations are no longer present to man; they are no longer meaningful
to us, no longer capable of religious influence. Therefore, Heidegger is silent about these past
manifestations; his thinking takes no account of them, i.e., is god-less" (Heuiegger on the
Divine: The Thinker, The Poet, and God [Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974],95). It
is interestingto notice that Heidegger did not choose to seek the knowledge of God by way
of analogy but through the more biblical revelatory approach. Unfortunately, his
philosophicalmethod required him to start from the revelation of God. Although God did
not reveal himself to Heidegger, or for that matter to other humans in his time, he chose not
to deny the possibility of the existence of God. On the contrary, he decided to wait for his
revelation in the future. In an arbitrary way Heidegger thought some poets were closer to
the divine or Holy than the philosophers. He himself speculated on the area of disclosure
of the Holy by way of commenting on some poems written by Holderin. I see no
intellectual hindrance to replacing the writings of poets with the writings of O T and NT
writers. Of course, I am willing to recognize the obvious limits of philosophy on the
question of God.

67Adetailed study of the question of God in Heidegger's work has been produced by
George Kovacs, The Question of God in Hezdegger's Phenomenology (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1990).
("ACriticism of TheologicalReason, 285-387.

but does not address the issue of his being." Yet, if we recognize that the
text is disclosing in words the presence of God, we have found the necessary
startingpoint for a philosophical reconstruction of the God principle. This
startingpoint is, in the realm of theology, analogous to Daein as aphilosophical
starting point in Heidegger's philosophy.70Biblical texts bring to light the
revelation of God's being in his historical presence.71As biblical texts on
'j9Thetendency to &associate God's presence from his Being shows up, for instance,
when Th. C. Vriezen comments on Exod 3:14-15. "In this name Yahweh reveals His Being
only in its 'formal aspect' by speaking of His actual presence. This is not a real qualification
of Yahweh's Being, for Yahweh does not mention His name; but at the same time He does
more than this: He gives man the most solemn assurance of his presence. For him who
understands this there is no more need to ask about His name. Taken in this way this word
of God to Moses typifies as shortly and essentially as possible all that Israel believes and
knows concerning God. This name Yahweh, thus taken to mean 'He who is' without any
further qualification of His Being, is therefore of fundamentalimportance. God can only be
denoted as the Real One according to the functional character of His Being, not in His Being
itself" (An Outline of Old Testament Theology [Oxford: Basil, 19581,236).
'The main difference between the approach I am suggesting and Heidegger's relates to
the selection of the starting point for phenomenological reflection. Heidegger starts from
Dasein as appearance;from Dasein he goes to the interpretation of the ground of Being; and
from the ground of Being he interprets God. The movement of biblical intelligibility,
which I suggest Christian theology should follow, is different. The starting point is not the
appearance of Dasein but the appearance of God. It is only from the appearance of God that
we can settle the issue of the Being principle and the interpretation of all philosophical
foundations.
71Thisstarting point comes to light only when we place the traditional philosophical
understanding of "appearancen in phenomenological epoche (see below, nn. 72 and 73).
Heidegger provides a summary description of the traditional meaning of "appearancen we
should discard by way of phenomenological bracketing. "At first sight [explainsHeidegger],
the distinction seems clear. Being and appearance means: the real in contradistinction to the
unreal; the authentic over against the inauthentic" (An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans.
Ralph Manheim [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 19871, 98). This understanding
originates with the Sophists and Plato, who declared appearance"to be mere appearance and
this degraded. At the same time, being as zdea was exalted to a suprasensoryrealm. A chasm,
chorismos, was created between the merely apparent essence here below and the real being,
somewhere on high. In that chasm Christianity settled down, at the same time reinterpreting
the lower as the created and the higher as the creator (ibid., 106). This notion of
"appearance" was adopted by Christianity as a result of the classical interpretation of the
God principle I described in sections 3 and 4. Heidegger has shown how, on the basis of
early "Greek interpretation of being as physic, and only on this basis, both truth in the sense
of unconcealrnent and appearance as a definite mode of emerging self-manifestation belong
necessarily to being" (ibid., 109). Appearance, then, is the manifestation of being. This
manifestation becomes the source of what shows itself in the phenomenon. Heidegger
summarizes his view by concluding that 'phenomenon,' the showing-itself-in-itself,signifies
a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. 'Appearance,' on the other hand,
means a reference-relationship which is an entity in itself, and which is such that what does
the 7.f-ng
(or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself
and is thus a 'phenomenon'" (Being and Time, 54).

God articulatethe meaning of his past, present, and future presence, the being
of God is brought into the clearingof consciousnessby way of thought and
words. The real ontic presence of God in space and time becomes the ground
for biblical reflection on his being and actions. Consequently, biblical texts
open a new way from which to search for the meaning of the God principle.
This way does not stand on the basis of philosophicalspeculation or imagination,
but rather on the recognition that our own accessto the Christianunderstanding
of any being, includingGod, is a careful listeningto the way in which they
present themselvesto us through the linguisticmediation of biblical writers.

Once we come to the point of recognizing the philosophical import
of biblical text, we are in a position to assess classical interpretations of the
God principle. To do that we need to place all previous scientificinterpretations
of the God principle under Husserlian epoche,," that is, in methodological
brackets. In other words, we should explicitlyand systematically avoid using
them while reflecting on the meaning of God opened before us by the original
reflection on the Christian God.n As we do that, we will discover that biblical
texts on God and on the sanctuary reveal that the God principle is compatible
with our space, time, and history. On this basis, we should deconstruct the
classical and modern understandings of the God principle and replace them
721nsearch of the scientific foundations of philosophy in the tradition of Descartes,
Husserl introduces the phenomenological methodology which includes epoche as the
methodological "bracketing," or "disconnecting," of traditionally received teachings of
sciences (Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W . R. Boyce Gibson
[London: George Allen & Unwin, 19521,109).Thus, he writes that "allsciences which relate
to this natural world, though they stand ever so.firm to me, though they fill me with
wondering admiration, though I am far from any thought of objecting to them in the least
degree, I disconnect them all, I muke absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate
a single one of the propositions that enter into their systems, even though their evidential value
is pdect, I take none of them, no one of them serves mefor afoundution-so long, that is, as it
is understood, in the way these sciences themselves understand it as a truth concerning the
realities of this world. I muy accept it only after I haveplaced it in the bracket. That means: only
in the modified consciousness of the judgment as it appears in disconnection, and not as it
figures within the science as its proposition, a proposition which claims to be valid and whose
validity I recognize and make use of" (ibid, 111). According to Husserl, "the
phenomenological epoche includes all the sciences natural and mental, with the entire
knowledge they have accumulated" (ibid., 171). See also Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, WO), 135137. Emphasis original.
"This is a methodological procedure similar to the one Heidegger's investigation of the
meaning of the Being principle applied to the ontological tradition. Heidegger used a
modified version of Husserl's phenomenological epoche not only to suspend judgment, but
also to destroy (deconstruct) traditional ontology (Being and Time, 44,49).

with a technical formulationof the biblical understandingof God. We should
deal with the other philosophical principles in the same manner.
The critical analysis of the theological understanding of philosophical
principles I have briefly sketched becomes the methodological condition
for overcomingthe metaphorical interpretation of the sanctuary in Christian
theology." As we recognizethe hermeneuticalrole of philosophcalprinciples
in Christiantheology, and interpret them on the basis of biblical reflection,
a consistent theological interpretation of the sanctuary that preserves its
God-building-beings structure becomes possible.

Z Summary and Conclusion
Philosophical foundations relate to the biblical sanctuary motif because
they play the role of hermeneutical principles operative in its theological
w
interpretation.Amongthe philosophicalprinciples called to p
role in Christiantheology we identified the Being, God, human nature, and
nature (the world) principles. Because in the biblical texts the sanctuary
consistently reveals a God-building-beingsstructure, the God principle (in
dose relation to the nature [world]principle) directly conditions its theological
interpretation. Philosophicalprincipleswork, for instance, by determining
the nature of the reality to which the biblical texts refer, thereby determining
whether the passage addresses its subject matter in a plain literal or in a more
imaginative metaphoricalsense.In theology, metaphoricaldiscourse is usually
calledto fit the parameters of reality dictatedby the philosophcal interpretation
of its subject matter.
Classical and modem theological traditions,usually embracingthe timeless
view of the God principle originated by Parmenides and Plato, interpret
the sanctuary metaphorically. The timelessness of God, which makes no
room for the notion of building or the notion of a succession of divine actions,
requires a metaphorical interpretation. Consequently, sanctuary texts cannot
speak of God directly but only metaphorically. Thus, the metaphorical
interpretation of the sanctuaryinvolves a transposition of the historical and
spatial c re understand in^ of the biblical texts to the timeless understanding
dictated by the God principle. In the process, theologians are forced to
achieve consistency by reducing the God-building-beingsstructure of the
biblical texts to either a God-beingsor a God structure of which the sanctuary
texts can only speak metaphorically.
I have argued that a critical approach to the interpretation of traditional
philosophicalprinciples may open an alternate way to interpret the biblical
"Apparently, sanctuary texts assume that God is capable of relating directlyto humans
in a building. Specifically,the idea of God does not rule out his direct relational involvement
with created beings within the limitations of space and time.

sanctuary, to help us overcome the metaphorical approach. A theological
view of the sanctuary texts that, while preserving theological consistency,
will not be compelled to deny the God-building-beingsstructure of biblical
thinking requires a reinterpretation of philosophicalprinciples, particularly
of the God principle. The possibility of reinterpreting the philosophical
understanding of the God principle hinges on the existenceand identification
of a starting point for reflection. The starting point, fortunately, is given
to us in the prescientific understandingof God's presence expressedin biblical
thinking. When we recognize that biblical reflection on God simultaneously
reveals not only his historical presence but also his being, aview of the God
principle compatible with our space and time comes into view. We need
only formulate that view in technical categoriesand use it as hermeneutical
principle for the interpretation of the biblical sanctuary. This interpretation
of the God principle eliminates what has forced classical and modern theologies
to various metaphorical interpretations.

